Dawkins, Plantinga, and the Delusion Controversy

Here is an article I ran across a while back.  It was written by Alvin Plantinga (Notre Dame).  He is known for basically solving the logical problem of evil.  Interesting stuff. 

Enjoy, everyone!

Click here to read the article.

 

Craig takes on Dawkins

William Lane Craig (PhD, ThD) takes on Dawkins at a talk he gave a while back.  I have to concur with Craig.  According to one who has been known to be the “greatest philsopher of religion still writing” (Alvin Plantinga PhD, Notre Dame), Dawkins’ book is at best sophomoric. 

Enjoy, everybody!

soli Deo gloria!

argument for God based upon moral imperatives

 

1. Either there are moral objective truths, or there are not moral objective truths
2. There are moral objective truths
3. Moral objective truths find no basis in the combination of matter, chance, and evolution, for it could have been the case that morals could have been different given a different set of evolutionary circumstances
4. Matter, chance, and evolution do not account for the “imperative feature” in objective moral truths

   (a) Based upon the idea that moral truths are not mere “facts” but that some also include imperatives—that is, there is an “ought” feature in moral truths

   (i) i.e., the fact that “killing babies for fun is wrong” implies the imperative that one should not kill babies for fun.  The combination of brute matter, chance, and evolution does not account for such an imperative  

    

5. The “imperative feature” of objective moral truths can only be made sense of if  and only if objective moral truths are commands in essence
6. Commands are only made sense of if it implies a transcendental moral Commander
7. This moral Commander is what most of humanity refers to as God
8. Therefore, God exists

Just for fun: Is there anything wrong with this argument, or should it be considered a good argument for God’s existence?  I think that 4 (a) (i) is particularly strong given that the combination of brute matter, chance, and evolution could not have possibly produced such an imperative.  I think if someone were to refute this argument, then it would be incumbent upon them to come up with some way to explain why and how brute matter has given us not only objective moral facts (i.e., killing babies for fun is wrong), but also objective moral imperatives (i.e., one ought not kill babies for fun). 

What’s interesting is that if the atheist denies that there are objective moral imperatives–that is, “oughts”–, then he/she will not only deny their humanity, but they will also have to give a reason as to why they feel the moral imperative to refute the above argument.  So, in denying the existence of moral imperatives, they would actually be affirming the existence of moral imperatives.  After all, why feel the need–dare I say, “imperative”– to refute the argument? 

 

If you are an atheist, then I would like an answer to the following question (after you give plausible reasons as to why the above argument is wrong):  Why do atheists work so hard to fight against those people (i.e., theists) who believe in the existence of someone who does not exist?  Seems like atheists are responding to an inner moral imperative.  But moral imperatives seem to be those type of things that only a transcendant being could give!  Absurd, if you ask me.  

Monkeys, Hamlet, and Atheism

Someone once said that if you sat a million monkeys at a million typewriters for a million years, one of them would eventually type out all of Hamlet by chance. But when we find the text of Hamlet, we don’t wonder whether it came from chance and monkeys. Why then does the atheist use that incredibly improbable explanation for the universe? Clearly, because it is his only chance of remaining an atheist. At this point we need a psychological explanation of the atheist rather than a logical explanation of the universe.

Peter Kreeft (PhD, Boston College)